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ost studies on memories ignore their own audi-
ence, as Wulf Kansteiner warned us some years 
ago.1 Because stories matter and because memory 
can be assigned and attributed to certain social 
groups, there will necessarily be competing memory cultures. 
Kansteiner argued that collective memory is a result of complex 
processes of production and consumption that acknowledge 
different traditions, values, and interests.2 This is very true in the 
case of the memory politics of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 
which has recently been transformed and now includes a new 
focus on women’s experiences and memories, perhaps a sur-
prising development at first glance. 
In discussing the gender history of 1956, the main question is 
whose stories are being told.3 This means that when discussing 
women’s memories of 1956 we need to distinguish the produc-
ers and consumers of collective memory from the traditions 
of gendered memory and the appropriations of memory. Ap-
propriation was used by Michel de Certau in underlining that 
consumption is not a passive process. The producers of memory 
are building on their own meanings and values through the con-
sumption of culture, which is at the same time a revisitation of 
culture. 
Never has so much money been in-
volved in commemorating the 1956 Revo-
lution than for the commemorations in 
2016. The Official Gazette announced the 
government decision 1728/2015 to com-
memorate 1956, which was backed by 
unprecedented — and not very transpar-
ent — public funding.4 There were 2,500 
proposals submitted for grants from this 
fund, of which 1,600 were supported. 
In 650 villages and cities, a total of 1,430 
events were held to commemorate the 
1956 Revolution.5 The history of the 13 
days of the 1956 Revolution, which was quickly crushed by the 
Soviet occupation of the country, was a key foundational nar-
rative of post-1989 Hungarian democracy, and therefore it is no 
surprise that the Christian-Conservative FIDESZ-KDNP govern-
ment paid such special attention to this celebration. This article 
explores the roots of the paradigm change of gender politics of 
commemorating the 1956 Revolution by the illiberal Hungarian 
state.6 It argues that the women’s history turn in commemora-
tion practice is a part of this paradigm change in memory politics 
and that it has its roots in revisionist history writing.
The absence of women in the  
historiography of the 1956 Revolution 
The bloody foundation of a collaborationist state was laid after 
the Soviet occupation of Hungary that crushed the revolution 
on November 4, 1956, and imprisoned or executed many of its 
participants. Already from the beginning of the Soviet occupa-
tion of Hungary, different interpretations of the events have 
been written both in conflict and in dialogue with one another, 
and have constructed a divided collective memory. Before 1989, 
the history of the failed 1956 Revolution was already a target of 
meaning-making processes. Collabora-
tion with the Kádár regime was at the 
center of these debates and became the 
basis of self-definition for different po-
litical actors after 1989. History writing 
has always been a process in which dif-
ferent groups in communication with 
each other produce new narratives and 
create discursive spaces, and this is 
why it is crucial to trace how women’s 
memories are represented, construct-
ed, and appropriated.
The history of 1956 was taboo before 
1989 as the Kádár regime (1956—1989) 
by Andrea Pető
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In 2016, commemorations of the 60th anniversary 
of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution brought new 
conflicts in memory politics. This article analyzes 
the reasons for women’s absence from the histo-
riography of the 1956 Revolution and discusses 
how the polypore state is using the populist turn 
to introduce hegemonic narratives and to include 
women in the narrative of “national feminism”.
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was founded on the crushed revolution in collaboration with 
the Soviets. The frame of history writing was heavily ideological, 
and it labeled the 1956 Revolution a “counter revolution”, aiming 
to fill up the rhetorical space about the events while politics en-
forced historical amnesia of the revolution through effective cen-
sorship and imprisonment.7 Forgetting, omission, and amnesia 
were successful tools for depoliticizing Hungarian society after 
1956. Bloody oppression led to the largest wave of migration as 
200,000 men and women fled Hungary over the course of only 
four months. 
After many had emigrated, participants in the 1956 Revolu-
tion started to write a different history abroad in order to record 
their version of events. Outside Hungary, for example, the Imre 
Nagy Institute in Brussels (1959—1963) was focusing on writing 
about 1956 as the political history 
of important men.8 Hungarian 
émigrés were writing the history 
of 1956 without a particular inter-
est in women because their main 
framework of interpretation was 
anti-communism and political his-
tory. Women were present in the 
histories as wives and daughters of 
important male politicians, but they were not seen as worthy of 
the attention of historians other than as mirrors to the activities 
of great men.9 
Inside Hungary there have been different layers of silence 
about the 1956 Revolution. Members of the democratic op-
position, including János M. Rainer — the future director of 
1956 Research Institute and biographer of the executed prime 
minister, Imre Nagy — were writing in samizdat publications.10 
The samizdat Beszélő featured an article on 1956 in every issue 
because it worked with the truth paradigm and its aim was to 
delegitimize the foundational myth of the K ádár regime. The 
articles were countering the false statements and narratives of 
the Kadar regime based on testimonies and archival research in 
order to set up a hegemonic position for the interpretation of the 
1956 Revolution through the truth paradigm. This was a very dif-
ferent form of memory politics from that of the Polish opposition 
where dissidents were promoting the resurgence of romantic 
nationalism in opposition to the internationalism of communist 
historiography. After 1989, the official 1956 Research Institute 
grew out of the risky process of collecting and indexing the oral 
history testimonies of distinguished members of the democratic 
opposition. In the oral history collection, women as wives and 
daughters only remember the deeds and actions of their fathers, 
partners, and husbands. 
THIS APPROACH OF writing the history of 1956 without women 
both in Hungary and internationally is far from innocent. 
Horowitz warns in analyzing the gendering of the Holocaust 
that, while the gender-neutral approach produces a unified ver-
sion of the past “that unintentionally ends up occluding experi-
ences particular to women”, the concentration on essentialist 
differences “inadvertently reproduces the marginalization of 
women”.11 When women are denied the acknowledgement of 
their active role, they are also denied future involvement in po-
litical processes. Writing a history of their own was a key political 
demand of emancipatory struggles like the women’s movement 
and worker’s movement and meant revising the already existing 
canon and writing a counter-canon.
After 1989, one might wrongly assume that the collapse of 
communism brought a major change in the historical narrative 
about 1956, especially because forced amnesia together with the 
meta-narrative of “counter-revolution” had produced a variety 
of conflicting meanings of 1956 that were already visible during 
the festive reburial of Imre Nagy on June 16, 1989. Stefan Auer 
warned in 1989 about the real political dilemma regarding the 
legacy of 1956, namely how a regime that was set up as a result of 
peaceful roundtable negotiations 
could relate to the legacy of a vio-
lent revolution. Intellectuals, the 
driving force of the 1989 transition, 
were advocating the concept of a 
“self-limiting revolution”, the idea 
of a “return to normality”, and 
the ideals of an ethical civil society 
and “anti-politics”.12 For Hannah 
Arendt, 1956 was an example of a “spontaneous revolution”, in 
the term coined by Rosa Luxemburg, and this was diametrically 
opposed to the ideals and values of the participants in the Hun-
garian Roundtable Talks.13 The popular memory of the “boys of 
Pest” — very young, working-class men who were fighting with 
weapons against the occupying Red Army — was sidelined in the 
canonized historiography of 1956 after 1989 as being an example 
of political radicalism. Workers’s councils that played a key role 
in 1956, praised by Arendt, as alternatives to the party system, 
were difficult to appropriate in the transition process driven by 
political parties and not by movements.14 The post-1989 neolib-
eralization of Hungary was based on stripping workers of their 
rights and slicing up the trade union movement and privatizing 
its property. This transformation was led by political parties at-
tempting to create apolitical neoliberal subjects, and not by a 
popular movement.15
AFTER 1989 THERE was a great public need for consumption and 
appropriation of the past and for access to new information, 
which led to the opening up of formerly closed archives. Narra-
tives written by professional historians and individual stories 
about the events remained necessarily separate. As part of this 
new division of memory, the story that could be told after 1989 
in the public sphere was exported by Hungarian dissidents and 
followed the traditional gender stereotypes. Instead of a meta-
narrative of “counter revolution”, family stories were told in 
which women were seen only as wives and victims.
After 1989, the variability and plurality of the interpretation 
of past events also gave legitimacy to the 1956 Revolution. A re-
membered past is connected to identity formation, and omitting 
and ignoring the memory of women in the events of 1956 oc-
curred in parallel with excluding women from political citizen-
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ship and the revival of stereotypical male and female images in 
the collective memory.16 Women’s memory of 1956 was missing 
from the historiography because it could hardly fit in the frame-
work for constructing gendered political citizenship after 1989, 
and this for several reasons. 
FIRST, BECAUSE the image of the armed female fighters was dis-
turbing to the social order, there was also little discussion of 
women as leaders or as politicians. Women’s agency and autono-
my were non topics. Second, the 1956 Revolution was also fought 
against communist emancipatory politics, and it was in several 
aspects a conservative revolution. It lasted for only 13 days, 
which was not enough time for the internal political conflicts 
and contradictions to play out publicy. Demands of the workers’ 
councils, such as overturning the liberal abortion laws in Hun-
gary and installing a nationalist, pro-natalist agenda labeling the 
right to abortion a communist trick to destroy the nation, were 
not generally publicized during important debates about rede-
fining reproductive rights after 1989.17 Third, in their life stories, 
conservative and far-right female politicians entering political 
life after 1989 narrated 1956 as a turning point in their lives — as 
the moment when they became anti-communists. Therefore, the 
memory of 1956 was necessarily more empowering for conserva-
tive and far-right female politicians than for progressive forces.18 
For the few female politicians on the progressive side, relating 
to these events of 1956 was not an option because they had a 
strong anti-communist agenda and progressive politics failed 
to relate critically to the state communist period. Instead, the 
rhetoric of anti-communism was successfully used to discredit 
the traditions and values of progressive politics. Fourth, due to 
the continuity of gender stereotypes in family memory, the his-
tory of 1956 has been the story of heroic men and loving female 
relatives who also suffered but who cared for their beloved sons 
and partners. Remarkable female politicians were rare during 
communism, and also rare in the democratic opposition.19 
Including women in history:  
framing matters
This historiography based on the omission of women fundamen-
tally changed when the history of the women’s silent demon-
stration of December 4, 1956 was written by Borbála Juhász as a 
master’s thesis submitted to CEU in Budapest. Juhász analyzed 
women as political actors and identified the different axes of 
forgetting in historiography.20 The history of tens of thousands 
of women who silently protested against the Soviet occupation 
in Budapest and in some other cities, the only public protest 
against the Soviet occupation, has been omitted from the histori-
ography of 1956. Silence about the event is even more disturbing 
as Hannah Arendt, in her reflection on the Hungarian Revolution 
of 1956, considered this women’s demonstration to be the last 
revolutionary political action: “The silent procession of black-
clad women in the streets of Russian occupied Budapest, mourn-
ing their dead in public.”21 Although this demonstration was not 
broken up by the Soviet Army, as Arendt claimed, it was still 
the beginning of a new era of women’s participation in politics. 
Mourning and maternal feminism proved to be powerful politi-
cal strategies during the military occupation.22
WOMEN SLOWLY BECAME acceptable and worthy topics of histori-
cal research, but without the traditional framing being ques-
tioned. The first step in the analysis of women’s presence in 1956 
is to count them in photographs and among the imprisoned and 
executed. Mária Palasik analyzed the number of women in the 
photo collection of the 1956 Institute and in the archives of the 
State Security Services.23 She pointed out after analyzing photos 
of iconic events of the revolution that, for example, women 
were present in the demonstration in front of the Parliament on 
October 23rd. As night fell, the women left due to possible threats 
to their safety, so women are missing from the photos taken at 
the same spot later that day.24 The proportion of women in the 
photos was about 10% (depending on the time when the photo 
was taken), and they made up about 4% of those who were per-
secuted after the revolution.25 The distribution of charges and 
indictments handed down against women has raised method-
ological questions because women were not only indicted for 
multiple charges, but also often arrested for political reasons or 
charged with criminal or economic offenses and not with politi-
cal offenses, so that they are missing from the statistics. Palasik 
claims that 14.8% of women who were arrested were charged 
with participation in armed clashes, 14.8% with making provoca-
tive statements, 18.3% with spying and putting up posters, 9.5% 
with giving medical aid to fighters, 8.3% with editing and distrib-
uting flyers, 7.1% with denunciations, 4.1% with participating in 
women’s demonstrations, 3% with hiding weapons, and 0.6% 
with membership in the revolutionary national guard. Only 8.3% 
were charged with participating in workers’ and revolutionary 
committees or parties.26 This distribution, compared with the 
percentage of women in the post-1945 people’s tribunal cases, 
shows that the gender distribution was very much the same and 
was reflective of traditional gender stereotypes.27 These results 
also show that gender inequality in women’s participation in 
public life had not really changed during the forced emancipa-
tion process of communism. 
Three other directions have been taken in researching wom-
en’s participation in the 1956 Revolution. The first was the book 
by Kőrösi and Molnár, which used the testimonies of children to 
introduce the concepts of silences and silencing in intergenera-
tional memory. The book features testimonies of children about 
their mothers and how they coped while their fathers were in 
prison.28 The second line of inquiry was pursued by Zsófia Esz-
ter Tóth, who analyzed the absence of references to 1956 in her 
interviews with female workers in a textile factory in Budapest. 
1956 as an event only featured in their stories because they were 
assigned empty flats by the state due to the massive emigration 
that took place after the Revolution. Tóth claimed that women 
workers were rarely in leadership positions and that the work-
ers’s councils were only recruiting them as secretaries.29 The 
third was a major book by Zsuzsanna Bögre who interviewed 
women and reconstructed the history of 1956 through the nar-
ratives of women.30 Four topics emerged from her interviews 
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— the first day of the Revolution, the solidarity that was fostered 
during the Revolution, the moral purity of the people, and the 
date of the Soviet invasion, November 4. The meaning-making 
process of using exact dates of canonical events and the pomp-
ous style of narration were due to the timing and context of the 
interviews as these interviews were recorded in 2003. The first 
Orbán government (1998—2002) had started a re-canonization 
of the narrative and had opened up space for women’s stories in 
the national feminist framework of victimhood and suffering.31
This absence of women as political actors in the history of 
1956 was, surprisingly, replaced by their presence in the celebra-
tion of 1956 in 2016, which brought a number of events com-
memorating women in 1956. This increase in the visibility of 
women also resulted in recycling the article by Borbála Juhász 
— which is available online without any reference to the original 
work — in political speeches, articles, blog posts, and exhibitions 
because there was no other relevant research available on this 
topic. The most visible change in the politics of memory has 
been the surprisingly large number of billboards in Budapest 
advertising the deeds and martyrdom of women in the 1956 
Revolution. Twenty-three persons were portrayed on these 
billboards, and 20 of them were easy to identify, including 5 
women. But most notably, university students, workers’s coun-
cils, military personnel, and prominent members of the revo-
lutionary government were missing from this commemorative 
line-up. The absence opened up space for presence as they were 
























replaced by street fighters from Budapest who were only rep-
resenting the social and economic deprivation during commu-
nism.32 Even the commemorative postage stamp issued for this 
occasion featured women in arms. The radical popular memory 
of 1956, which had been marginalized in 1989, had returned by 
2016. The women on the billboards — Havrilla Béláné Sticker 
Katalin (1932—1959),33 Sponga Julianna (1937—1990),34 Szeles Erika 
(1941—1956), and Wittner Mária (1937—) — were all from poor and 
troubled families and worked in precarious jobs when the Revo-
lution opened space for them to believe that they were agents of 
their own fate.35 Wittner, who survived 
a death sentence, became a face of the 
anti-communist political regime and 
later a FIDESZ MP.36 Ilona Tóth (1932—
1957), a medical student and also from a 
poor family, allegedly killed a young sol-
dier whom she believed worked for the 
Hungarian State Security Agency. The 
debate over whether it was a show trial 
or whether she was really a murderer is 
ongoing among historians.37
Manipulation of photos had already 
started in 1956. Photos about fighting 
women with weapons in Budapest 
were mostly staged by the mostly young 
western freelance photojournalists who were covering the fight-
ing. Some of the fighting and escape scenes that were widely cir-
culated in the press were staged in peaceful Austria for the west-
ern media who did not want to venture out for a risky journey 
to Hungary behind the Iron Curtain. It is no surprise that in 2016 
the billboards appropriated these staged photos for their own 
purposes.38 The mediatization of the revolutionary events and 
personalities continued on the billboards as bodies were Photo-
shopped out and rifles were added to maximize the effect.39
THE SUDDEN PROMINENCE of some women whose stories of 1956 
had not been featured before (except Ilona Tóth) is due to the 
“women’s history turn” in history writing. This new school of 
history writing is a way for the illiberal state to appropriate the 
memory politics of historical events for its own purposes. The 
major traveling exhibition about women in 1956 was entitled “56 
Teardrops — Women’s Destinies” and summarized the contents 
of this shift in memory politics: 
In memoires and historical publications, very often 
the only focus on women’s activity in 1956 is the silent 
women’s demonstration of December 4th. However, 
women were caring for the wounded, printing flyers, 
helping in kitchens, and sometimes even participating 
in the fighting; therefore, the crushing of the revolution 
impacted them. As museologist Fanni Lukács, one of 
the curators of the exhibition, said to the Hungarian 
News Agency, the exhibition also highlights that women 
and girls lost their husbands and fathers in the fighting, 
and this fact influenced their lives greatly. There were 
instances when one was not allowed to return to the 
elementary school because her father had participated 
in the revolution. Others were fired from their jobs or 
imprisoned.40
Absence was replaced by the presence of women, but within a 
framework in which the history of women was written in terms 
of suffering, sacrifice, and victimhood, and not in terms of agen-
cy or subjectivity. During the celebrations in 2016, the women 
of 1956 were presented in the frame of “national feminism”, in 
which women’s actions were evalu-
ated in terms of how useful they were 
for the national project. “National 
feminism” is emerging from revisiting 
the history of 1956, and it is reducing 
stories and testimonies to politically 
acceptable notions of patriotic femi-
ninity and setting them up as an exam-
ple for present-day Hungarian women. 
In the case of the 1956 Revolution, fe-
male street fighters are only presented 
as victims of communist repression 
and not as women who decided to take 
part in an armed struggle. The sexual 
harassment and violence committed 
against street fighters by their fellow heroic fighters have also not 
been discussed publicly.
Genesis of the memory politics  
of the illiberal state
In 2010 and in 2014, FIDESZ — in coalition with the Christian 
Democratic Party — won the elections in Hungary and set up a 
new system of governance called: the System of National Coop-
eration (NER).41 During the past years, FIDESZ has been under 
international pressure to comply with written laws and Euro-
pean liberal values. And despite taking over all kinds of policy 
agencies, state institutions, and funding opportunities — FIDESZ 
has not encountered nor invited the formation of any effective 
political opposition. This proves that FIDESZ over the past years 
has set up a successful form of governance, which is not setting 
the stage for future electoral victories, but also indicating new 
paths for obviously successful governance. In recent years, 
political scientists and political analysts have been forced to re-
consider not only their analytical toolkit, but also their concepts 
in order to try to understand this new phenomenon — calling it 
“democratic authoritarianism”, an “illiberal state”, or a “mafia 
state”, just list few of the new terms. Along with the Polish soci-
ologist Weronika Grzebalska, in comparing Hungary and Poland 
we argued in our previous work about a new form of governance 
stemming from the failures of globalized (neo)liberal democracy, 
which created states that are weak for the strong and strong for 
the weak.42 Based on its modus operandi, we call such a regime 
an “illiberal polypore state” because it feeds on the vital resourc-
es of the previous political system while contributing to that sys-
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THE POLYPORE STATE works with what is referred to as “mnemon-
ic security”, and with the control of hegemonic forms of remem-
brance.43 The translation of history and its application, and thus 
its identity-shaping effects, have become a geopolitical factor. Af-
ter 1989, fueled by anti-communist sentiment within the former 
Eastern Bloc countries and by the memories of retributions that 
took place during the Soviet occupation, anti-communism be-
came the foundation along with the revision of the progressive 
political tradition at both the national and international level. 
Memory politics plays a key role in this process. Different states 
are silencing stories about their own acts of discrimination that 
are integral parts of their history in order to show themselves 
to be a victim. The memory politics of the “polypore state” is to 
duplicate, depoliticize, and empty the narrative about women’s 
presence and agency during the 1956 Revolution in order to ap-
propriate the Revolution’s meanings and to attribute meanings 
of victimhood and anti-communism. 
These developments are not unique to Hungary, as it is dem-
onstrated in this special issue. The recent turn of “herstory” 
writing in Central European countries has left feminist historians 
and secular human rights activists puzzled. However, the illib-
eral memory politics is not coming from nowhere. 
Gábor Gyáni, the renowned Hungarian historian, mentioned 
two reasons for this when analyzing developments in the histo-
riography of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in 2006. The first 
is the post-structuralist turn in history writing after 1989 that un-
dermined the professional standing of historians in public life.44 
If everything is a narrative or a discourse, anybody can be a his-
torian. This democratization has opened up spaces and oppor-
tunities outside the profession for 
constructing new narratives. From 
the 1970s, as a part of this “new 
history”, feminist history aimed 
to make women visible in order to 
transform the writing of history. 
Those who were engaged in what at 
first glimpse might be considered 
a hopeless activity believed in the 
impact of their work — to make the 
world a better place by writing a 
different history that would help 
to “right the injustice”. This was 
particularly evident in the fact that 
those who were interviewed for the 
first collections of testimonies on the events of 1956 by members 
of the democratic opposition were also those were missing from 
the official history of the events. Collecting women’s oral history 
collects information about the event and the meaning-making 
process.45 By telling our own story, we gain power over our lives, 
and therefore women’s testimonies also give importance to 
women’s actions.
Representatives of “new history” argued that writing politi-
cal history was the center of national history writing,46 as it was 
in the case of writing the history of 1956. National history and 
political thinking are processes of inclusion and exclusion. In the 
center of this narrative is the male citizen, who is fighting for the 
nation. Everybody else, including women and ethnic minorities, 
is on the margins. As Gianna Pomata has argued, gender history 
is analyzing national and universal history in terms of the roles 
that gendered characteristics and symbols have played in histori-
cal events and processes.47 
The novelty of “new history” is the inclusion of class, gender, 
and ethnicity as categories of analysis. But this “new history” 
is not merely a genre of “writing of history”, but rather is con-
structed as an alternative “culture of history”, marking systems 
and points of connections to the past by constructing pluralities 
of interpretations instead of a single canonized narrative. This 
narrative strategy offers a new path for gendering history, but it 
is still supposed to fit in and refer to the “old canon”, and thus 
be but one of several narratives about nation and democracy. 
This plurality of discussion also influences the definition of what 
sources count as legitimate because the question is no longer 
“what happened”, but rather how to redefine the relationship to 
the past based on visual sources, statues, testimonies, and ritu-
als. 
THE CANON OF women’s history writing its place in the national 
historiographies of Central Europe after 1989. As Liakos points 
out, “Writing history means to internalize the canon, and to be 
ascribed in a mental geography prescribed by the canon.”48 At 
the same time women’s history was necessarily pushed towards 
a particular history, pointing out a void in prior historiography. 
This negative approach is aptly characterized by Liakos: “The 
idea of not belonging to the canon creates a consciousness 
of absences and failures which 
could be described as a ‘negative 
consciousness’: negative in the 
sense that the consciousness is not 
defined by what the subject is, but 
by what the subject is not, that is, 
the adoption of a perspective of 
self-exclusion.”49 Therefore, writ-
ing women’s history defined itself 
as separate with the hope of filling 
in the void. 
Writing women’s history in 
Central Europe has a specific intel-
lectual history.50 In this paradigm, 
women’s history found a place 
for itself, joining the stream demanding the revision of history 
based on oral history testimonies, while beginning through con-
ferences and conference volumes to build up its own canon, or 
a canon of their own, to paraphrase Virginia Woolf. During this 
process in the early 1990s, women’s history partly functioned as 
a revisionist history because it undermined and/or revised the 
previous canon by bringing in a new group, namely women, as a 
legitimate focus of historical analysis. 
Writing women’s history emerged in that region as a part 
of the European neoliberal modernity in the transition of 1989 
from communism to democracy. But the normative power of 
“ORAL HISTORY BECAME 
A POPULAR METHOD OF 
COLLECTING STORIES 
OF ‘HOW THE 20TH 
CENTURY HAS REALLY 
HAPPENED’ WITH THE AIM 
OF CREATING A COUNTER 
CANON TO COMMUNIST 
HISTORY WRITING.” 
49peer-reviewed article
Europe (the EU) and the international framework has been 
weakening in recent years. The triple crises — the financial crisis 
of 2008 and the refugee crisis together with security problems 
— contributed to the previously consensual neoliberal concept 
of Europe becoming multilayered and to the emergence of new 
actors. Alternative concepts of Europe have gained momentum, 
and different forms of illiberal governance have influenced, 
among other important institutions, the infrastructure of writing 
history.51 These characteristics of writing women’s history as a 
revisionist history were connected to “negative consciousness”, 
which made it extremely vulnerable to reconceptualization dur-
ing the second transition of the build-up of the polypore illiberal 
states and the associated populist turn. 
THE REASON WHY women suddenly came to the center of the cele-
bration of the 1956 Revolution in 2016 was the revisionist charac-
ter of women’s history. History writing and teaching history still 
treats women’s history as separate, or, as Virginia Woolf wrote 
nearly a hundred years ago, as an appendix. Paradoxically, the 
practitioners of women’s history mostly consider this separation 
and particularism as a fruitful and promising path for developing 
women’s history. 
According to Tucker’s typology, historical revisionism uses 
three strategies: significance-driven revisionism, that is, when 
there is a change in what historians find significant in history, 
evidence-driven revisions, when new evidence is discovered, and 
value-driven revisionism, when historical events and processes 
are re-evaluated because a new system of values becomes he-
gemonic.52 These three kinds of revisions cannot be divided so 
strictly, but women’s history writing can mostly be considered 
as belonging to value-driven revisionism, which makes women’s 
history vulnerable to populist redefinitions. Women’s history 
writing has never reached the status of significance-driven re-
visionism, especially because it is a part of “new history”. 53 De-
manding that women’s stories should be included based on eth-
ics is not enough, because this process of revision is a political 
power struggle, and the actors should understand how politics 
works and how people are mobilized for different struggles.
GÁBOR GYÁNI also argued that the second cause is the fact that the 
post-modern turn was combined with the emerging importance 
of personal recollections about events (ego documents, oral 
histories, testimonies, diaries, etc.) as sources.54 Only personal 
sources about the history of 1956 were considered as authentic 
and true, in opposition to the history of falsifications during 
the Kádár regime of 1956—1989. While the “age of witness”55 in 
Holocaust historiography addressed experiences of new vic-
tim groups and came up with unprecedented and innovative 
methods of historical research, the case of writing the history 
of the 1956 Revolution in Hungary has resulted in the opposite 
— including a marginalization of professional historians and an 
overwhelming description of personal experiences instead of 
theorizing, as well as marginalizing the experiences of certain 
groups while prioritizing those of others, such as women. 
The history of 1956 is mostly based on oral tradition. Because 
the Revolution lasted only 13 days and was followed by bloody 
repression and heavy censorship, documents were either pro-
duced by the repressive state or remained in the oral tradition. 
As connected to the demand of ”recovering the truth”, this 
means that testimonies were labeled as true, not just authentic. 
The positivistic credo of Langlois and Seignobos, written in 1898 
in Introduction aux études historiques ”L’histoire se fait avec des 
documents. Pas de documents, pas d’histoire?” still pursues 
historians today. “New post-stucturalist history” has not stopped 
following the “source driven” nature of history and rational 
idealism, saying that all of history can be truthfully understood 
if there are enough sources available. These sources, however, 
were mostly oral sources presenting a claim to authenticity and 
truth in a historical culture in which multiple stories were com-
peting for hegemonic status.
Writing the history of 1956 started off in the positivist and 
rationalist idealist frame. Several books were published of collec-
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tions of interviews that were to be analyzed as written memory 
documents. The spoken words of testimonies became written 
documents. Collections of interviews are hosted at the Institute 
of Political History (the former Institute of Party History and 
Oral History Collection of the 1956 Institute). The 20th Century 
Institute and the House of Terror started collecting their own 
testimonies from survivors whom they had selected to create 
their own collection. Testimonies serve in this paradigm as au-
thentic and true memories. Families and the private sphere were 
sites where , it was hoped, the state could not penetrate, and 
they were the main sites of identity formation defining “us” and 
“them”. Family was also the site that was the most resistant to 
statist feminist emancipation and where expectations regarding 
femininity and masculinity had not changed much, thus leading 
to the emergence of “familialism” after 1989 in gender equality 
politics.56
THE THIRD FACTOR contributing to the change of illiberal memory 
politics is that after 1989 there was a shift in memory studies 
towards a truth paradigm that sought to counteract the previous 
manipulative historiography of communism. The category of 
memory has been placed in the center of scholarly investiga-
tions, and in this process a memory boom of alternative personal 
stories and new methods of oral history has resurfaced. “Truth” 
has become a personalized matter, making the individual sub-
ject the subject of history writing. In this paradigm, women’s his-
tory writing was introduced seemingly on a winning ticket as life 
stories became an acknowledged subject after 1989. At the same 
time, the quickly emerging new historical canon integrated both 
the previously dominant truth framework and new truths, in-
cluding women as the subjects of history writing.57 
The truth paradigm as a framework for history writing was 
necessarily strengthened in Central Europe after 1989. The idea 
was that political freedom made it possible to access the veracity 
of history because political manipulation was no longer imposed 
on readers. Previously inaccessible archives were opened up 
for researchers, and this was the period of “archive fever” de-
scribed by Jacques Derrida.58 The belief is that the truth and its 
explanations are there in the archives and you just have to find it 
because, and here is the chance for conspiracy theories, the ar-
chives were closed and hidden from you by unidentified powers, 
although these powers are mostly understood to be “the com-
munists”. Oral history became a popular method of collecting 
stories of “how the 20th century really happened” with the aim of 
creating a counter canon to the communist history writing.59 
Towards a new paradigm  
of gendered memory politics 
The illiberal memory politics’ use of the women’s history turn 
is informed by the populist turn. Duncan Light pointed out, 
while analyzing the transition of 1989, that the various nations 
of Central Europe were moved “by the desire to construct new 
post-communist identities, characterized by a democratic, plu-
ralist, capitalist and largely westward-looking orientation”.60 
Now a deepening reversal is present — these identities are not 
democratic, not pluralist, not capitalist, and certainly not west-
ward looking. Instead, as I pointed out in my article on far right 
memorialization practices in Hungary, the community of jointly 
experienced suffering defines national identity. And community 
itself is seen as anti-pluralist. The newly emerging and victorious 
anti-modernism, which from a social and spiritual point of view 
questions neoliberalism, also turned history into an ideological 
weapon in order to reach its political aims and to offer a livable, 
real, and acceptable alternative future. This anti-modernism 
goes hand in hand with revisionist history writing (and “history 
politics”), which defines the nation as a community of victims 
(always referring to those who caused the suffering) and offers 
redemption in the near future. As a result of this revisionist his-
tory writing, large meta-narratives are being constructed, new 
methods are being used, and new sources are being discovered, 
all of which refer to the position of the narrator of the story. This 
narrative position, as Eric Hobsbawn wrote in The Guardian, 
comes down to “my truth is as valid as your truth”.61 This stance 
entails a general opposition to universalism in non-traditional 
history writing. This anti-universalism and the relative statute 
of truth connect revisionist history writing to women’s history 
writing. This connection is transformed into a socializational 
fight, to use the words of Gramsci, and both streams define new 
historical sources as legitimate historical sources.62 The revision-
ist history writing is fighting against communist history writing, 
while women’s history writing opposes the sanctification of 
social hierarchies. 
The revisionism of “new history” together with the truth 
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paradigm informed by anti-communism made the previous nar-
rative about 1956 vulnerable when the populist turn brought in 
the “my truth is as valid as your truth” framework. As a result 
of the populist turn, the memory politics of the illiberal state is 
focusing on people, not on leaders — “the people” have spoken — 
and it is no longer individuals who are the agents of history. The 
commemoration of 1956 labeled the events as the revolution of 
the masses, as was emphasized on the official website: 
We can say it out loud now, that this revolution did not 
have leaders, in this revolution and freedom, people 
raised their arms because their real leaders had been 
executed, forced to emigrate, or imprisoned, and those 
who replaced them were servants of foreign, soviet oc-
cupying forces who betrayed them.63
The familial turn as a major component of the polypore state em-
phasizes women’s roles as caregivers, wives, and daughters. The 
roots of familialism go back to the 1956 Revolution and can be 
found in the historiography written by émigrés and members of 
the democratic opposition, together with the missing paradigm 
shift in 1989. The evidence for this is in what has happened with 
the visual representations of those women who were selected 
to be on the billboards. The women on the billboards are repre-
sented as innocent and caring women with light makeup — while 
tough street fighters are presented as victims — and heavily Pho-
toshopped. This type of history writing is based on the fetishiza-
tion of complementary gender differences, just as we saw prior 
to 1989. And if it is not accompanied by a critical scrutiny of its 
production, it can be fraught with the same dire consequences 
as ignoring the very same differences.
The emerging anti-gender discourses have had a major im-
pact as far as the future of writing women’s history is concerned. 
The turn in women’s history writing is a hegemonic fight, in the 
Gramscian sense, for controll of the process of writing history. 
Revisionist history writing is successfully applying the same 
methods and theories used in women’s history writing, and 
by doing so it is creating another counter canon. As far as the 
politics of presence is concerned, there are women in history, 
but in a fundamentally different frame. The triple crises of 2008 
also determined the challenges which women’s history writing 
faces as a form of revisionist history writing, while at the same 
time anti-gender movements are challenging the definition of 
gender.64
The professional response to the institutionalized memory 
politics of the illiberal state remained in the frame of “negative 
consciousness”. At the major scientific conference in Eger titled 
”1956 and Socialism” held on September, 8-10, 2016, only six out 
of nearly 100 conference papers focused on the history of wom-
en in 1956. In all six papers, all published in a women’s studies 
journal, women were discussed as prostitutes, workers, wives, 
and as symbolic representations.
THE GOVERNMENT OFFENSIVE to use public spaces for the memo-
rialization of its version of history also mobilized civil resistance. 
The group “Living Memorial”, which was founded to protest 
against the Monument of German Occupation on Liberty Square 
also participated in this resistance with a guerilla exhibition.65 
They set up a series of four panels entitled “Living ‘56: The Non-
amended Memory of the Revolution” in front of the controver-
sial and highly popular House of Terror museum to show what 
was missing from the remembrance. All of the panels included a 
small inset with the text: “Did you know that this was also part of 
the 1956 Revolution? Do you agree that no one should appropri-
ate history? These are a couple of things that are being left out 
of the official narrative.” The signs were then dedicated to the 
intellectuals and politicians, to the journalists and writers, to the 
Imre Nagy group, and to students and workers detailing the roles 
they played in the revolution. Needless to say that all were men. 
The illusion of 1989 — that un-politicized memory spaces are pos-
sible because there is a consensus on what the good fight is — is 
still present among historians. The illusion that the present back-
lash will be over at some point is still haunting the profession, 
which does not seem to recognize that this is not an innocent 
omission but a socialization fight to hijack the memory of 1956. 
Unlike the case of Holocaust memorialization, the turn towards 
witnesses' testimonies was not based on a consensus, but rather 
on conflicting hegemonic claims. The “new history” writing 
opened up space for an even “newer history” that is using the 
same revisionist methods. Only a rethinking of relationships to 
politics and to the political can change power relations in this 
hegemonic fight. The belief that the memory of 1956 is a living 
memory, and that it is possible to reintegrate the previously 
omitted social groups and personalities into the revised history 
of 1956, is a fight that was lost from the beginning. ≈
Andrea Pető, professor, Central European University
Note: Previous versions of this paper were read at the conference 
“1956 and Its International Environment” organized by the British As-
sociation for Slavonic and East European Studies, Institute for Foreign 
Affairs and Trade in Budapest, on December 9, 2016, and at the 
“Gender and Peace Conference” at Sabanci University of Gender in 
Istanbul on May 6, 2017. I also gave a previous version of this paper as 
a keynote lecture at the Institute of Polish Culture, University of War-
saw, on May 29, 2017, and as a guest lecturer at Andrassy University 
in the lecture series “1956/2016” on October 13, 2016. I am grateful for 
questions and comments from the audiences and the commentators.
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